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This paper presents a review of recent trends in the architectures of financial
supervision, focused on the authorities' design. This work is useful for evaluating
the worldwide situation, using a sample of sixty-eight countries.
The starting point is the blurring effect that is taking place in the banking and
financial industry. The blurring effect is evident in the increased integration of
the banking, securities and insurance markets, as well as their respective products
and instruments.
The blurring effect causes two interdependent phenomena: (1) the emergence
of financial conglomerates, which is likely to produce important changes in the
nature and dimensions of the individual intermediaries, as well as in the degree of
consolidation of the banking and financial industry; and (2) growing
securitization of the traditional forms of banking activity and the proliferation of
sophisticated ways of bundling, repackaging, and trading risks, which weaken the
classic distinction between equity, debt, and loans, bringing changes in the nature
and dimensions of the financial markets.
The financial blurring process creates at least three areas of debate regarding
the financial supervisory structure:' (1) sectoral approach versus functional
approach; (2) single supervisory model versus multi-authorities model; and (3)
centralized setting versus decentralized setting.
It is a fact that, in the perspective of increasing financial integration, the
relevance of the first question has been rapidly declining. The institutional
approach is based on the possibility of separating the banking, securities, and
insurance markets. The progressive erosion of market separation is likely to
cause the "default" of the institutional approach. The fact that various models of
such an approach have been adopted recently or are currently under discussion in
several countries confirms the hypothesis that the financial blurring trend favors
the alternative functional approach.
From another point of view, particularly in the European contest, the
centralized versus decentralized question seems to be a second-order problem.
The alternative solutions are likely to be strictly dependent on the various
European national answers to the optimal design of the supervisory framework
and closely linked to the answer of the single supervisory approach versus multi-
authorities approach dilemma.
* Full Professor of Monetary Economics, Paolo Baffi Centre, Bocconi University, Milan, and
Department of Economics, Mathematics and Statistics, University of Lecce.
1. Giorgio Di Giorgio & Carmine Di Noia, Financial Market Regulation and Supervision: How Many
Peaks for the Euro Area?, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 463, 463-466 (2003).
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Therefore, given the dominance of the functional approach and the
"postponed" nature of the centralized-decentralized questions, the alternative
between the single financial authority model ("SFA") and the multi-financial
authorities model seems to be the more relevant debate.
The success of the SFA model seems to be growing, particularly in the
European area. Among the fifteen original members of the EU, Austria,
Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom ("U.K.") have chosen to
delegate the supervision to a single authority, different from the central bank. The
single supervisor has been adopted also in four recent EU member countries-
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Malta-as well as in Norway and Iceland. Outside
Europe, a unified agency was established in Korea, Japan, and Nicaragua,
respectively.
Prima facie, the single supervisor model seems to be the natural and best
answer to the challenges posed by market blurring. If, in the long run, the
expected financial structure is a perfectly integrated and single market, the best
design for the supervisory architecture would seem to be the single authority.
But the answer is apparently not that simple.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the debate on the
financial supervisory architecture, focusing on the single authority versus multi-
authority dilemma. Sections III and IV perform a comparative analysis, using
institutional indicators of the degree of consolidation in the supervisory powers
and of the level of the involvement of the central bank in the supervisory
structure. Section V offers a general review of the possible determinants of the
consolidation process. Section VI puts forward some conclusions as well as
perspectives for further research.
II. E PLURIBUS UNUM? THE DILEMMA OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION
UNIFICATION AND THE POLICYMAKER ROLE
A strand of recent literature 3 pointed out that, given different institutional
settings, it is possible to highlight the corresponding gains and losses4 and
perform a rational cost-benefit analysis to choose between alternative models.5
2. Karel Lannoo, Challenges to the Structure of Financial Supervision in the EU, 22nd SUERF
Colloquium, Wien. (2000); Clive Briault, The Rationale for a Single National Financial Services Regulator,
FSA Occasional Paper 2(1999), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/occpapers/OP02.pdf (last visited June
15, 2005).
3. Christian Hawkesby, The Institutional Structure of Financial Supervision: A Cost Benefit Analysis, 2
J. INT'L BANKING REG. 36, 54 (July 2000).
4. See generally Jost DE LUNA MARTINEZ & THOMAS A. ROSE, INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF
INTEGRATED FINANCIAL SECTOR SUPERVISION (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3096, 2003),
available at http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/wbkwbrwps/3096.htm (last visited June 15, 2005) (providing a
complete analysis on the arguments for and against integrated supervision).
5. See generally CHARLES M. KAHN & Jo o A.C. SANTOS, ALLOCATING BANK REGULATORY POWERS:
LENDER OF LAST RESORT, DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND SUPERVISION (Monetary and Economic Department, BIS
Working Papers, n.102), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/att/baiswp/2001102.html (last visited June 15,
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The principal advantage of a single authority lies in the fact that it avoids the
complex issues associated with the allocation of supervisory tasks.6 The use of a
single authority may result in economies of scale and scope, especially where
various operating divisions can be created. The economies of scale and scope
may derive from the fact that the single authority can benefit from a centralized
operating unit, with benefits from the standpoint of human resources, information
systems, etc. Furthermore, it avoids the useless multiplication of costs associated
with the existence of multiple authorities. A single authority's presence may also
lead to reduced information costs, because cooperation and interchange can be
better ensured among the various supervisory sectors. The costs associated with
supervision can be reduced.
There can be significant benefits for the supervised parties, who need deal
with only a single agency, especially regarding authorization procedures. All
ambiguities regarding tasks-who exercises supervision and is responsible for
each procedure-are eliminated.
Another advantage of the single authority is that it may reduce the risks of
arbitrage in supervision, ensuring greater regulation neutrality through the
unification of the sector regulations.
Nevertheless, the single authority model also presents problems and potential
risks. According to some authors, the cost advantages associated with a single
authority are not necessarily true, since the single authority compromises
specialized divisions that may themselves be affected by problems of
coordination and information interchange. It seems unlikely, however, that the
costs of information coordination and sharing sustained by the various divisions
of a centrally managed authority could exceed the costs associated with
cooperation between different authorities.8
Another argument against the single authority is its potentially higher profile.
This model of supervision could be associated with the idea, not necessarily true,
of a totally secure financial system, an idea that would reduce the incentives for
the supervised parties to have operating systems based on prudence and would
relax the caution of consumers-investors toward the financial services offered.9
2005) (offering a theoretical analysis of several alternative institutional allocations of regulations in the specific
banking regulation area).
6. Donato Masciandaro & Angelo Porta, Single Authority in Financial Market Supervision: Lessons for
EU Enlargement, in FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION IN THE NEW EUROPE (Donato Masciandaro ed., 2004).
7. CHARLES GOODHART ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: WHY, HOW AND WHERE Now?, (Routledge
1998) [hereinafter FINANCIAL REGULATION].
8. Lannoo, supra note 2.
9. Id.
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A further argument against the single authority refers to the fact that the
"institutional failure" of such an authority in implementing a specific task, since
it is active in several sectors, would generate broader negative effects.
Therefore, it is possible to agree with the initial intuition-the importance of
the cost-benefit analysis-but the relative conclusion on the possibility to find
the optimal supervisory regime seems to be rather unsatisfactory. First, given a
single authority, it is possible to increase the efficiency in the relationship
between supervisor and regulated firms because the cost of supervision and the
possibility of supervisory arbitrage decrease.'0
Nevertheless, given the single supervisor model, efficiency in the supervisor-
regulated firm relationships decreases because with a single authority, the capture
risks could increase," and the innovations incentive in the regulated industry
could decrease. 12 Therefore, the sign and the magnitude of the single supervisor
model effects, with respect to the regulated firm relationship issues, seem rather
vague and ambiguous.
The same kind of conclusion can be reached by analyzing the relationship
between the single authority and the political system (independence and
accountability,'3 discretion 14 or capture'5 ), the effects in terms of supervisory
organization and resource allocation (economies 6 or diseconomies of scale, 7
10. Briault, supra note 2; Charles Goodhart, The Organizational Structure of Banking Supervision, 31.1
ECONOMIC NOTES 1 (2002); David Llewellyn, Introduction: the Institutional Structure of Regulatory Agencies,
in How COUNTRIES SUPERVISE THEIR BANKS, INSURERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS (Neil Courtis, ed. 1999).
11. MARC QUINTYN & MICHAEL TAYLOR, REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY INDEPENDENCE AND
FINANCIAL STABILITY (IMF Working Paper 2002), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/imf/imfwpa/0246.html
(last visited June 21, 2005).
12. JAMES R. BARTH ET AL., A CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSIS OF THE BANK SUPERVISORY FRAMEWORK
AND BANK PERFORMANCE (Economic and Policy Analysis Working Paper 2002-2, 2002), available at
http://www.occ.t reas.gov/ftp/workpaper/wp2002-2.pdf (last visited June 21, 2005).
13. Richard K. Abrams & Michael W. Taylor, Assessing the Case for Unified Sector Supervision, Risk
Management and Insurance International Conference (2001); Briault, supra note 2; Lannoo, supra note 2;
Llewellyn, supra note 10. See Quintyn & Taylor, supra note 11 (explaining the meaning of regulatory and
supervisory independence); THORSTEN BECK ET AL., BANK SUPERVISION AND CORPORATE FINANCE, (NBER
Working Paper, n. W9620, 2003), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/9620.html (last visited June
21, 2005) (examining the impact of bank supervision independence on corporate financing obstacles).
14. FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 7; Quintyn & Taylor, supra note 13. See Taylor, supra note
11; see also Briault, supra note 2; Llewellyn, supra note 10 (reviewing the risks of excessive power of a single
regulator).
15. INGO FENDER & JURGEN VON HAGEN, CENTRAL BANK POLICY IN A MORE PERFECT FINANCIAL
SYSTEM (ZEI Policy Paper, 1998).
16. See Abrams & Taylor, supra note 13; Briault, supra note 2; CLIVE BRIAULT, REVISITING THE
RATIONALE FOR A SINGLE NATIONAL FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATOR (FMG Special Paper, n.135, 2002);
Goodhart, supra note 10; Lannoo, supra note 2; Llewellyn, supra note 10 (claiming that the economies of scale
argument is most applicable in small countries or those with small financial systems); Abrams & Taylor, supra
note 13 (arguing that the shortage of supervisory resources is a serious problem, particularly in emerging market
economies).
17. FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 7.
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benefits or costs of goal conflicts' internalization"), and the consequences on the
financial services costumers behaviour (confidence' 9 or over-confidence 20 ).
It is manifestly evident that the quest for an optimal degree of supervision
unification cannot be pursued through a simple analysis of the costs and benefits
expected from the possible alternative structures. A theoretical analysis of the
potential effects of alternative supervisory structures does not take us very far.
The first natural response to this problem would therefore be to estimate the
real effects the two alternative supervisory models have on key economic
variables. 2' But this immediately fosters at least three orders of difficulty.
Firstly, the emergence of a single authority is only the most striking aspect of
a more general and gradual phenomenon: diversification, from country to
country, in the degree of centralization of financial supervisory power.
Compared to the traditional model of control by sectors, some countries have
confirmed the diversification model while others have radically changed it by
adopting a single authority, and still others have taken or confirmed intermediate
choices. This raises the problem of measuring the degree of concentration of
powers, country by country, in order to attempt the quantitative description of a
qualitative phenomenon. Hence, the first objective of the research agenda is to
improve the descriptive analysis.
Secondly, the issue of the optimal degree of concentration of financial
supervisory powers has emerged only recently, with the reforms adopted in
various countries. Thus, considering the type of supervisory regime as an
explicative or exogenous (though not unique) variable of any other economic
phenomenon requires an analysis of an extremely short historical series, with all
the related problems of interpretation.
Thirdly, completely and satisfactorily identifying what the key economic
variables are, and the most possible object of an estimate on which a supervisory
structure makes its effects felt, is not a simple problem. Alternative supervisory
structures may, for example, affect the level of efficiency of the public resources
invested in monitoring the financial markets. Indicators can be found for the
efficiency phenomenon, and empirical analysis can therefore proceed.
18. Briault, supra note 2; Lannoo, supra note 2; Llewellyn, supra note 10; Larry D. Wall & Robert A.
Eisenbeis, Financial Regulatory Structure and the Resolution of Conflicting Goals, 16 J. FIN. SERVICES
RESEARCH 223 (1999).
19. Llewellyn, supra note 10.
20. Lannoo, supra note 2.
21. James R. Barth et al., The Regulation and Supervision of Bank Around the World: A New Database,
in INTEGRATING EMERGING MARKET COUNTRIES INTO THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (Robert E. Litan &
Richard Herring eds., 2001).
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The point is that alternative structures may also (perhaps especially) affect
other variables that are important but less easily expressed by concise indicators.
Examples are reputation risk, and the risk that the authority will be captured by
the policymakers or by the controlled intermediaries. Thus a quantitative search
for the effects of alternative supervisory structures is probably premature.
It might be interesting, rather, to ask: are there any common determinants in
the decision each country makes to maintain or reform its control structure?
Finding a response would help us not only to interpret what has happened in the
past but also to project scenarios of change for the future.
The second objective of the research agenda is to attempt to concentrate on
an analysis of the causes that have helped bring about a given supervisory
structure in different countries.
Our analysis is consistent with a political approach to the supervisory
design. 22 The approach we intend to follow here-extending the indication that
the new political economy 23 has formulated in analyzing the definition of public
policies-is to consider the supervisory structure with one or more authorities as
a dependent variable, determined in turn by the dynamics of other structural
variables, economic and institutional, that can summarize and explain the
political process that leads a country to maintain or reform its supervisory
structure.
A country confirms or reforms its supervisory structure when its
policymakers decide to do so. While we do not believe that policymakers are
always and ever benevolent dictators, nor do we wish to exclude this a priori, we
can assume that these decisions are generally determined, in turn, by structural
factors of a financial, economic, and institutional nature. The search for these
factors is a task for economic analysis.
III. THE DEGREE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION UNIFICATION
If we wish to consider the financial supervision unification as a dependent
variable determined by the policymaker, the first problem is to construct this
variable. The question is: how to "measure" the degree of concentration of
financial supervision?
To this end we use a Financial Authorities Concentration Index ("FAC
Index").24 The creation of the FAC Index is based on an analysis of which and
how many authorities in sixty-eight countries are empowered to supervise the
22. Donato Masciandaro, Central Banks or Single Financial Authorities? A Political Economy
Approach, Central Banks and Single Financial Authorities in Europe (forthcoming 2005) (describing this
approach).
23. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, POLITICAL ECONOMY: EXPLAINING ECONOMIC POLICY (2000).
24. Donato Masciandaro, Unification in Financial Sector Supervision: the Trade Off between Central
Bank and Single Authority, J. FIN. REG. AND COMPLIANCE (forthcoming2005) [hereinafter Unification in
Financial Sector].
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three traditional sectors of financial activity: banking, securities markets, and
insurance. To transform the qualitative information into quantitative indications,
and to gauge the degree of consolidation of each national regime of national
supervision, the information has been assigned a numerical value to each type of
authorities design, according to the following scale:
7 = Single authority for all three sectors (total number of supervisors =
1);
5 = Single authority for the banking sector and securities markets (total
number of supervisors is two);
3 = Single authority for the insurance sector and the securities markets,
or for the insurance sector and the banking sector (total number of
supervisors is two);
1 = Independent specialized authority for each sector (total number of
supervisors is three).
The rationale with which the values have been assigned considers the
concept of concentration of supervisory powers: the greater the concentration, the
higher the index value.
The FAC Index has elected to assign a value of five to the unique supervisor
for the banking sector and securities markets because of the predominant
importance of banking intermediation and securities markets over insurance in
every national financial industry. It is also interesting to note that, in the group of
unified supervisory agencies' countries, there seems to be a higher degree of
integration between banking and securities supervision than between banking and
insurance supervision;25 therefore, the degree of concentration of powers is,
ceteris paribus, greater.
These observations do not, however, weigh another qualitative characteristic:
different countries are characterized by the fact that one sector is supervised by
more than one authority.
It is likely that, other conditions being equal, when two supervisory
authorities exist in a given sector, one of which has other powers in a second
sector, the degree of concentration of power is greater. When, on the other hand,
there are two control authorities in a given sector, neither of which has other
powers in a second sector, the degree of concentration is reduced, because the
total number of supervisors increases.
25. De Luna Martinez & Rose, supra note 4.
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It would therefore seem advisable to include these aspects in evaluating the
various national supervisory structures by modifying the index as follows:
Adding one if in the country there is at least one sector with two
authorities assigned to supervision, and one of these authorities is also
responsible for at least one other sector;
Subtracting one if in the country there is at least one sector with two
authorities assigned to supervision, but none of these authorities has
responsibility for another sector;
Zero elsewhere.
Finally, there are three qualitative characteristics of supervision regimes that
we have decided not to consider in constructing the index.
Firstly, the institutional nature of the authorities involved in the financial
supervision setting has not been considered. In particular, in several countries it
is the central bank-i.e., the authority responsible for monetary policy-that is
responsible for at least one of the three sectors considered, typically the
supervision of the banking industry. The attribution of supervisory power to the
16
central bank has been at the center of an intense debate over the past decade.
By analogy with the problem discussed here, this debate has come to no
general conclusions, perhaps for the same methodological reasons illustrated
earlier. Furthermore, we have not considered the legal nature-public or
private-of the supervisory agencies, or their relationships with the political
system (degree of independence, level of accountability, etc.).
The FAC Index captures the degree of concentration of financial supervisory
power regardless of the nature of the institutions involved in this process, that is,
stressing just the importance of the number of supervisors involved. The role of
the nature of the authorities is considered later on, when we deal with the role of
the central bank in the overall architecture of financial controls.
26. Franco Bruni, Financial Stability, Regulation, Supervision and Modern Central Banking, in
CHALLENGES FOR CENTRAL BANKING (Anthony M. Santomero et al. eds. 2001); Di Giorgio & Di Noia, supra
note 1; Alicia Garcia Herrero & Pedro del Rio, Implication of the Design of Monetary Policy for Financial
Stability, 24th SUERF Colloquium, Tallin, Estonia (2003); Dirk Shoenmaker, Institutional Separation Between
Supervisory and Monetary Agencies, GIORNALE DEGLI ECONOMISTI E ANNALI DI ECONOMIA 9-12 (1992);
DONATO MASCIANDARO, CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE, BANKING SUPERVISION AND INFLATION (IGIER
Working Paper, n.53, 1993); Donato Masciandaro, Designing a Central Bank: Social Player, Monetary Agent
or Banking Agent?, 6 OPEN ECONOMIES REVIEW 399 (1995); Jos6 Tuya & Lorena Zamalloa, Issues on Placing
Banking Supervision in the Central Bank, in FRAMEWORKS FOR MONETARY STABILITY: POLICY ISSUES AND
COUNTRY EXPERIENCES 663 (Tomas Balino & Carlo Cottarelli eds., 1994).
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Secondly, at least in each industrial country, there is an authority to protect
competition and the market, with duties that impinge on the financial sectors.
But, since it is a factor common to all the structures, we have decided not to take
the antitrust powers into account in constructing the index.27
The FAC Index for the sixty-eight countries is shown in Table 1.
IV. THE DEGREE OF CENTRAL BANK INVOLVEMENT IN SUPERVISION
At this point, we should also consider the nature of the institutions involved
in the supervision responsibilities. Any supervisory regime has to provide a link
between the supervision and the central bank, given the potential relationships
between monetary stability and financial stability.28
It has been correctly pointed out 29 that, irrespective of what role, if any,
assigned to the central bank with respect to the prudential supervision, it is
universally the case that the central bank must be the authority for the stability of
the payment system, liquidity assistance to markets and solvent institutions, and
systemic stability. The debate of the optimal characteristics of this link is
particularly important in the EU, where monetary policy is separated from
financial supervision 
Therefore, we must ask what role the central bank plays in the various
national institutional structures.31 We focus on the degree of involvement the
central bank has in financial supervision as a whole. The specific nature of the
27. ELENA CARLETTI & PHILIPP HARTMANN, COMPETITION AND STABILITY: WHAT'S SPECIAL ABOUT
BANKING? (European Central Bank Working Paper Series, n.146, 2002), available at http://www.ecb.int/
pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwpl46.pdf (last visited June 21, 2005) (examining the relationship between competition
policies and stability).
28. Herrero & Del Rio, supra note 26; Abrams & Taylor, supra note 13; Charles Goodhart & Dirk
Shoenmaker, Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision be Separated?, 47 OXFORD
ECONOMIC PAPERS 539 (1995); Joseph G. Haubrich, Combining Bank Supervision and Monetary Policy,
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Economic Commentary (1996), available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/
research/com96/1196.htm (last visited June 21, 2005); Joe Peek et al., Is Bank Supervision Central to Central
Banking?, 64 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 629.(1999) (discussing the role of the central bank in banking supervision).
29. David Llewellyn, Introduction: Some Key Issues and Perspectives, in CHALLENGES FOR THE
UNIFIED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 7, 8 (2001) available at http://www.fin.ee/?id
=3528 (last visited June 21, 2005).
30. Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger, Briefing Paper on "The Conduct of Monetary Policy and an Evaluation
of the Economic Situation in Europe - 2nd Quarter 2001 "for the European Parliament: Should the European
Central Bank Be Entrusted with Banking Supervision in Europe?, (2001) available at http://www.europarl.
eu.int/comparl/econ/pdf/emu/speeches/20010528/20010528_eijffinger.pdf (last visited June 21, 2005);
Goodhart & Schoenmaker, supra note 28; Charles Goodhart et al., The Skill Profile of Central Bank and
Supervisors, 6 EUROPEAN FIN. REV. 397, 399-400 (2002), available at http://pluto.huji.ac.il/-efr/6/6_3
goodhart.pdf (last visited June 21, 2005); Tomasso Padoa-Schioppa, Financial Supervision: Inside or Outside
Central Banks, in FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE 160 (Jeroen Kremers et al. eds., 2003); Xavier Vives,
Restructuring Financial Regulation in the European Monetary Union, 19 J. FIN. SERVICES RESEARCH 57
(2001).
31. S. Oosterloo & J. De Haan, The Role of Central Banks in Fostering Financial Stability, in THE
HANDBOOK OF CENTRAL BANKING AND FINANCIAL STABILITY IN EUROPE (Donato Masciandaro ed., 2005).
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institution with respect to others is important since that relationship signifies that
the particular institution is the authority responsible for monetary policy and for
the stability of the payment system.
To highlight the central bank's role, we use an index of the central bank's
involvement in financial supervision: the Central Bank as Financial Authority
Index ("CBFA Index")." For each country, and the three main possible financial
sectors (banking, securities and insurance), the index is:
1= the central bank has no responsibility in any sector;
2 = the central bank has responsibility in one sector;
3 = the central bank has responsibility in two sectors;
4 = the central bank has responsibility in all three sectors.
Each national supervisory regime can be identified with at least two
characteristics: the degree of concentration of powers (FAC Index) and the
degree of involvement of the central bank in that distribution of powers (CBFA
Index) (Table 1).
The analysis of the degree of financial supervision concentration and the
level of central bank involvement provide us with a general picture of the
supervisory regimes around the world. From a theoretical point of view, given
the financial blurring trend, we can expect a higher or lower degree of
supervision concentration, irrespective of the role of the central bank.
The comparative picture is quite different (Figure 1). The two most frequent
models are polarized: on the one hand, nineteen countries with a high unification
of powers with low central bank involvement (Single Financial Authority
Regime); on the other, fourty-one countries with a low concentration of powers
with high central bank involvement (Central Bank Dominated Multiple
Supervisors Regime). The polarization phenomenon seems more evident in the
European Union and in the sample of industrialized countries.34
V. THE DEGREE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION UNIFICATION AND THE ROLE OF
CENTRAL BANK AS INSTITUTIONAL FACTOR
The descriptive evidence of the two most frequent financial supervision
regimes seems to correct the idea that, given the blurring process in the financial
landscape, there are two possible kinds of supervisory approach: (1) unification
under the roof of the central bank; and (2) unification in a different supervisory
32. Unification in Financial Sector, supra note 24.
33. Each central bank involved in the payment system is considered without supervision responsibility
and liquidity management only (and consequently in the crisis procedures).
34. Masciandaro & Porta, supra note 6.
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body. In reality, the unification of supervision seems more evident in the case of
Single Financial Authorities Regimes, while in the case of Central Bank-
Dominated Multiple Supervisors Regimes the approach seems more consistent
with a "leader-followers" framework.
In other words, the descriptive analysis signals an interesting result: the
national choices on how many agencies must be involved in supervision is
strictly linked to the role of the central bank: the degree of supervision
unification seems to be inversely correlated with central bank involvement.
How do we explain this fragmentation effect given by the involvement of the
central bank in supervision? The central bank fragmentation effect can be
explained as a special case of rule-driven path dependence.35 Rule-driven path
dependence exists when, other conditions being equal, the choice of a given
design of rules depends on characteristics already existing or already determined
by the rules themselves.
In this case, a given policymaker's choice of supervision concentration level
will depend on the role the central bank plays in the supervision, or that the
policymaker has decided to have the central bank play. In other words, the
policymaker's choice can be viewed as a sequential process in which the
institutional status quo matters: the supervision concentration level is decided
based on the position of the central bank. If the role of the central bank is limited,
the supervision concentration level will probably be high and vice versa.
The central bank fragmentation effect can thus be explained as follows. Let
us assume that the policymaker in a given country must decide whether to
increase the supervision concentration level. Also assuming that the policymaker
must decide whether or not to institute a single financial authority, the central
bank's level of supervisory involvement may be high or low for that particular
country.
Let us first consider the case where the central bank's involvement is low.
The policymaker might raise the supervision concentration level by increasing
the involvement of the central bank. The supervision concentration level and the
central bank involvement would thus move in the same direction, but this does
not seem to be the case. Why?
35. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and
Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV 127, 153-166 (2000); see GORDON L. CLARK & DARIUSZ WOJCIK, Path
Dependence and the Alchemy of Finance: The Economic Geography of the German Model, 1997-2003 (2003)
available at http://www.geog.ox.ac.uk/research/wpapers/economic/wpg04-21.htm (last visited June 21, 2005)
(using the concept of rules driven path dependence in the corporate governance literature).
2005 / Financial Supervision Architectures and the Role of Central Banks
First of all, the policymaker may not wish to involve the central bank in
supervisory responsibilities to avoid moral hazard phenomena in the controlled
intermediaries36 (moral hazard effect). Or the policymaker may wish to avoid
increasing the bureaucratic powers of the central bank since it is already
responsible for monetary policy (bureaucracy effect).37 Thus, in the case of a
central bank not involved in supervision, the increased supervision concentration
level may be achieved by creating a SFA.
If, on the other hand, the central bank is heavily involved in supervision, the
policymaker may increase the supervision concentration level in one of two
ways: by increasing the powers of the central bank or by assigning them to a
single financial authority.
Again, the policymaker could fear that the safety net-the central bank's
function of lender of last resort-might be spread to a wider set of institutions
than just banks if the central bank is also involved in supervising insurance and
securities firms (moral hazard effect). Furthermore, we can add another
explanation: in a country where the central bank is deeply involved in
supervision, the policymakers mighty fear the creation of an overly powerful
bureaucratic agency (bureaucracy effect). The policymaker may therefore not
wish to increase the involvement of the central bank.
At the same time, however, the policymaker may not be in a position to
reduce the central bank's level of involvement in supervision, or may not regard
it as advisable, especially if the policy of the central bank has been effective
(reputation endowment effect)." Since the policymaker has decided (or was
unable to decide) neither to increase nor reduce central bank involvement, he also
decides not to increase the level of supervision concentration. Therefore, in cases
where the central bank is heavily involved in supervision, there is a tendency not
to increase the level of supervision concentration.
In summary, the degree of central bank involvement in supervision may
condition the policymaker in his decision to alter the supervision concentration
effect, according to an inverse relationship: the result may be the central bank
fragmentation effect.
36. LLEWELLYN, supra note 29.
37. Donato Masciandaro, Financial Supervision Architectures: Economics, Politics, Institutions and
Law, 22 ECONOMIA POLITICA 101 (forthcoming 2005).
38. Id.
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Table 1. CBFA INDEX & FAC INDEX in 69 countries
Countries CBFA FAC
Index Index
1 Albania 2 1
2 Argentina 2 1
3 Australia 1 6
4 Austria 1 7
5 Belarus 2 1
6 Belgium 1 5
7 Bosnia 2 0
8 Brazil 3 2
9 Bulgaria 2 1
10 Canada 1 3
11 Chile 1 3
12 Colombia 1 3
13 Croatia 2 1
14 Cyprus 2 1
15 Czech Republic 2 1
16 Denmark 1 7
17 Ecuador 1 3
18 Egypt 2 1
19 Estonia 1 7
20 Finland 1 5
21 France 3 1
22 Georgia 2 1
23 Germany 1 7
24 Greece 2 1
25 Hong Kong 2 1
26 Hungary 1 7
27 Iceland 1 7
28 India 2 0
29 Ireland 4 7
30 Israel 2 2
31 Italy 3 2
32 Jamaica 2 3
33 Japan 1 7
34 Jordan 2 1
35 Latria 1 7
36 Lithuania 2 1
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Countries CBFA FAC
Index Index
37 Luxembourg 1 5
38 Macedonia 2 1
39 Malaysia 3 3
40 Malta 1 7
41 Mauritius 2 3
42 Mexico 1 5
43 Moldova 2 1
44 Netherlands 3 2
45 New Zealand 2 1
46 Norway 1 7
47 Pakistan 3 4
48 Peru 1 3
49 Philippines 3 2
50 Poland 1 1
51 Portugal 3 2
52 Romania 2 1
53 Russia 2 1
54 Slovak Republic 2 2
55 Slovenia 2 1
56 South Africa 2 3
57 South Korea 1 7
58 Spain 3 1
59 Sri Lanka 2 1
60 Sweden 1 7
61 Switzerland 1 5
62 Thailand 2 1
63 Trinidad and Tobago 2 1
64 Tunisia 2 1
65 Turkey 1 1
66 UK 1 7
67 Ukraine 2 1
68 USA 2 0
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Figure 1. The Supervisory Regime in 68 Countries, 2003
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V1. THE DETERMINANTS OF THE FINANCIAL SUPERVISION UNIFICATION
The analysis conducted in the preceding pages claims that each country has
its index of concentration of powers of financial supervision, which reaches its
maximum level in cases where there is a single authority and the minimum when
there are more than three supervisors.
Now we are prompted to ask: can common determinants be found in the
decisions the policymakers in each country have made in recent years to maintain
or reform their supervisory structures?
Our response is precisely to regard the supervisory structure with single or
multiple authorities as a dependent variable, determined in turn by the dynamics
of other structural, economic, and institutional variables, which can summarize
and explain the political process that leads policymakers in one country to decide
to maintain or reform its supervisory regime.
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What are the structural variables that can explain the decisions of national
policymakers? Policymakers can decide the architecture of controls on the basis
of institutional characteristics and of the economic and financial characteristics
of their country. In particular, we can assume that the physiognomy of the
institutional system and that of the banking and financial system are relevant in
each country. Having identified in the above section a possible relevance of the
role the central bank plays in the supervisory regime, it may be interesting to
consider this aspect as well.
To assess the relationship between the policymakers' decisions to determine
the financial architecture, and the economic and institutional characteristics of
each policymaker's own country, we can estimate a model of the probability of
different regime decisions as a function of these structural variables. This model
can be estimated with an ordered Probit model or with a ordered Logit model."9
We have produced an econometric analysis of the Probit and Logit types: the
dependant variable is the FAC Index, while the independent regressors proved
are a broad set of economic, financial, and political variables, based both on our
own assessment of variables that could play a significant role in explaining the
financial regime, and on data availability. The selected sample is the broader one,
represented by 68 countries.
As previously claimed above, no theory exists on the relationships between
politics and financial supervisory architecture. Therefore, we try to test the more
general hypotheses.
Firstly, policymaker choices made with a view to maintaining or reforming
the financial supervisory architecture could depend on the structure of the
financial systems itself. The modern debate on financial structure confronts the
equity dominance model (or market based regime) with the bank dominance
model (or bank based regime).40 Furthermore, recent literature points out the
close relationship, in every country, between the financial structure model and
the corporate governance model, with particular attention to the relative political
determinants. Therefore, the first relevant question is: does the financial structure
model (i.e., the private governance model), and the private governance factor,
matter in defining the policymaker's choices on the level of concentration in the
supervisory structure?
The expected sign of the relationship between the degree of supervision
consolidation and the private governance factor is undetermined (i.e., it can be
either positive or negative). In section two we stressed the importance of the
blurring process for the banking and the financial market worldwide. The
blurring process means potential changes in the nature and in the dimensions of
intermediaries (the financial conglomerates effect). In a bank based regime, if we
39. Id.
40. Ash Demigui-Kunt & Ross Levine, Bank Based and Market Based Financial Systems: Cross
Countries Comparisons, Development Research Group, Finance Department, World Bank (1999) available at
http://www. worldbank.org/research/projects/finstructure/pdf-files/structures3.pdf (last visited July 5, 2005).
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think that the policymakers' choices depend on the features of their own regime,
we can suppose a positive relationship exists between the kind of regime and the
degree of financial supervision consolidation, in the face of the financial
conglomerates effect. At the same time, however, the blurring effects mean
potential changes in the nature and in the dimensions of the financial markets
(the securitization effects). Therefore, also in a market based regime, we can
expect a positive relationship between the kind of regime nature and the degree
of financial supervision consolidation, in the face of the securitization effect.
Secondly, the institutional environment (i.e., the public governance climate)
determines the ability of the policymakers to implement their choices. Then the
second relevant question is: does the quality of the public governance (public
governance factor) matter in defining the policymaker choices on the level of
concentration in the supervisory structure?
Also, the expected sign of the relationship between the degree of supervision
consolidation and the public governance factor is undetermined. In section two
we note that a policymaker, whatever is the financial regime of his country, can
choose a higher degree of consolidation in order to improve the capacity to face
the challenges proposed by the blurring process. Then we can suppose a positive
relationship between good governance indicators and financial supervision
consolidation. But, at the same time, a policymaker can prefer a single financial
agency in order to increase his probability of capturing the supervisory structure.
Therefore, we could also expect a relationship between bad governance
indicators and the financial supervision consolidation.
Finally, given the above descriptive analysis, we conclude our search for the
explanatory variables by using the CBFA Index. The political choice of the
optimal level of financial supervisors' concentration could be dependent on the
role of the central bank in the financial architecture.
The third relevant question is: does the degree of central bank presence
(central bank factor) in the financial supervision matter in defining the level of
concentration in the supervisory structure? Given the descriptive analysis
developed above the expected sign of the relationship between central bank
involvement and financial supervision consolidation is negative.
The econometric results seem really interesting. The results of the estimates
show the robustness of the role of central bank involvement in explaining the
degree of supervision concentration. In fact, the probability of a SFA is always
inversely and significantly related to the involvement of the central bank. The
institutional factor seems to matter.
How should the results be interpreted? First of all, the analysis seems to
confirm the rule-driven path dependence hypothesis. The prior choice of the
policymaker regarding "whom" to delegate supervisory policy seems to have
consequences on the choice of "how many" institutions to delegate, according to
an inverse relationship. The central bank fragmentation effect holds true: the
more the central bank is involved in financial supervisory powers, the lower the
degree of concentration of those powers is likely to be. The econometric analysis
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confirms the descriptive trade-off between supervision consolidation and central
bank involvement. The institutional factor seems to matter.
Secondly, the choice of the degree of supervisory unification seems to be
influenced by the characteristics of the financial markets. More specifically,
given a market-oriented model, the smaller these markets, and the lower the level
of economic development, the more likely it seems that the probability of
consolidation will increase, perhaps confirming the hypothesis of policymakers
conditioned by the "small country" situation. The financial factor seems to
matter.
Furthermore, a positive relationship between the market-based regime and the
degree of supervision consolidation seems to hold true. This fact could be
explained by the focus of policymakers on the securitization effect. In the face of
changes in the nature and dimension of the financial markets, policymakers prefer
to increase the degree of consolidation in the supervision structure. Alternatively,
this fact could also be explained by the role of financial conglomerates, if there
were robust evidence of a positive relationship between the degree of financial
deepening and development of cross-sector intermediaries.
Thirdly, the choice of policymakers to establish the concentration of
supervisory powers seems to be facilitated by an institutional environment
characterized by good governance. The relationship between good governance
and the supervision concentration process can be explained, if we suppose that a
policymaker who cares about soundness and efficiency would prefer the SFA as
the optimal choice in the face of the blurring challenges. Finally, the German and
Scandinavian roots of the law seem to matter. This law effect is puzzling. The
law and finance literature claims the existence of a strong relationship between
market oriented financial systems and the British law jurisdictions. Here, we don
not find that financial supervision unification is directly correlated with a market-
based regime, while a link exist with the civil law root, in particular with the
German and Scandinavian legal systems.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this paper was to discuss the current tendency toward the
concentration of powers of financial supervision.
First of all, the phenomenon of supervision unification does exist; the
comparative analysis of sixty-eight countries, based on institutional indicators
(FAC Index and CBFA Index), confirmed the qualitative impression that an
increase in the degree of concentration of powers was evident in the developed
countries, particularly in the EU.
Secondly, to empirically gauge the possible structural determinants of the
degree of concentration of powers, we use the results of an empirical analysis.
The approach was to consider the supervisory structure with one or more
authorities as a dependent variable, determined in turn by the dynamics of other
structural factors. Looking for common determinants in the decision each country
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takes to maintain or reform its supervisory architecture, the empirical analysis
highlighted that the level of financial supervision consolidation seems to depend
on the institutional, financial, political, and legal factors, while the effect of the
economic and geographical factors seems negligible.
The results seem particularly interesting for future research developments, in
the hope that it increases the availability of institutional information to expand
the sample of countries that can be analyzed. It will be necessary to study the role
of various structural factors-institutional, financial, political, and legal-in
determining the decision-making process of policymakers.
The proposed approach can be used to expand the filed of analysis. For
example, in recent years the design of the regulation and supervision of the
banking, financial, and insurance markets has been influenced by two phenomena.
On the one hand, as it has been stressed above, to safeguard financial stability,
supervision has undergone a unification process, with rationalization of the
controls and a reduction in the number of supervisory authorities. On the other, to
ensure economic and financial integrity, financial intelligence units have been
instituted in several countries, to make the national and international fight against
organized crime and terrorism more effective.
What relationship exists between these two tendencies? The question is
relevant, as it is important to proceed in the same direction to safeguarding stability
and integrity. The two phenomena are not automatically synergetic, however. In
fact, the institution of a unit specialized in the collection and processing of
information to combat money laundering could be an obstacle to the consolidation
of financial supervision. Furthermore, the institutional nature of the unit might also
lend it importance: the creation of an independent unit might run counter to the
need to rationalize and unify financial supervision. Therefore, it is important to
investigate the consistency between the supervision unification trend and the
establishment of financial intelligence units.'
From this standpoint, in-depth studies on the individual countries could be
interesting, reconstructing the underlying reasons and the decision-making process
that have driven the individual policymakers to select a given architecture of
financial supervision. In other words the narrative approach could be usefully used
in the financial supervision architecture field. Historical and institutional analysis
might also provide indications useful for the empirical part, so as to construct time-
series analyses of the dynamic evolution of the supervision concentration level in
the various countries.
41. Donato Masciandaro, Financial Supervision Unification and Financial Intelligence Units: A Trade
Off?, J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL (forthcoming 2005).
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Finally, from the theoretical point of view, the next step forward in the
research will be to model the policymaker decision framework to better highlight
the features of the institutional and political process that leads a supervisory
regime to assume given characteristics. Using the principal agent approach for
addressing the architecture of financial supervision seems a very promising
avenue for future research.
